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Abstract—The world is becoming an immense critical informa-
tion infrastructure, with the fast and increasing entanglement of
utilities, telecommunications, Internet, cloud, and the emerging
IoT tissue. This may create enormous opportunities, but also
brings about similarly extreme security and dependability risks.
We predict an increase in very sophisticated targeted attacks,
or advanced persistent threats (APT), and claim that this calls
for expanding the frontier of security and dependability methods
and techniques used in our current CII. Extreme threats require
extreme defenses: we propose resilience as a unifying paradigm to
endow systems with the capability of dynamically and automati-
cally handling extreme adversary power, and sustaining perpetual
and unattended operation. In this position paper, we present this
vision and describe our methodology, as well as the assurance
arguments we make for the ultra-resilient components and
protocols they enable, illustrated with case studies in progress.
Index Terms—Advanced and persistent threats, fault and
intrusion tolerance, extreme computing
I. INTRODUCTION
Information and Communication Technology (ICT) became
so important in our lives that a great deal of society’s
stakes is today placed on the cyberspace. The pillars of
this new environment are critical information infrastructures
(CII), increasingly considered a key factor of competitiveness
of modern societies. Generally designating the computerized
and networked part of physical infrastructures — such as
energy, telecom, or transportation — and a relevant example of
cyber-physical systems (CPS), they have been complemented
over the past few years with a set of emerging computer-
based CII. Increasingly relying on the Internet-Cloud complex,
these infrastructures support critical assets like: the ﬁnance
or public administration systems; social networks, whose
societal role has been more than conﬁrmed in recent years;
health and biomedical systems like e-biobanks, whose privacy
sensitiveness became an issue, with the emerging trend of
massive DNA sequencing; and ﬁnally, the emerging connected,
cooperating, and autonomous car ecosystems, which will soon
become another relevant CII.
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We predict a fast and increasing entanglement of classi-
cal critical utility information infrastructures (electrical, gas,
water, etc.) with telecommunications, Internet and cloud in-
frastructures, they themselves CIIs as explained above. The
scenario will be enriched by an Internet-of-Things (IoT) tissue,
whose explosive growth in the next few years is predicted
almost unanimously by many sources. A good example of
why this is inevitable is the advent of smart-grids for energy,
not to mention smart homes or assisted living. Both scenarios
will converge into one and only one: extremely large-scale
and extremely complex computer and network systems, where
classical computing devices coexist with embedded devices
(many of them mobile), in a practically seamless manner;
these devices will be highly programmable and dynamic; in-
formation processing (“IT”) will coexist with real-time control
(“SCADA”); computer-caused failures may be physical as well
as virtual.
This scenario may create enormous opportunities, but also
brings about similarly extreme security and dependability risks
which, if not mastered by design, may have very negative
impact on the profoundly ICT-dependent society we envision.
It is recognised in the cybersecurity strategies of several
countries that threats to critical information infrastructures
are to be feared. The value of the assets at stake in this
hugely interconnected and virtualised world is formidable
and, in consequence, is attracting the attention of organised
crime and cyber-terrorism, cyber-hacktivism organisations or
militias, and nation-state armies or agencies.
The key focal problem points that describe this situation
are: sheer insufﬁcient resilience of critical information in-
frastructures (CII) such as core networks, data centers and
power grids, against extreme levels of faults and intrusions,
especially advanced persistent threats or targeted attacks; new
risks of computer-borne physical damage, derived from the in-
terconnection of telco and Internet systems with cyber-physical
systems, ampliﬁed by the ever-increasing use of IoT com-
ponents, networked embedded gadgets and mobile devices;
organization of societies around pervasive e-xxx services and
social networks based on the Internet-Cloud complex, which
became de-facto critical to society, but exhibit a security and
2017 IEEE 22nd Pacific Rim International Symposium on Dependable Computing
978-1-5090-5652-1/17 $31.00 © 2017 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/PRDC.2017.21
92
dependability deﬁcit.
We will continue to see a combination of generic security
attacks and intrusions and accidental failures and disasters,
exhibiting low to average severity and requiring moderate
skills, mostly with overt process and effects, where severity
is linear with scale (number of targets affected, e.g. DDoS).
However, the new scenario we laid down above will bring in
new categories of threats, especially in the malicious domain.
We will witness an increase in very sophisticated targeted
attacks, or advanced persistent threats (APT), perpetrated by
highly skilled, motivated and highly resourced adversaries (0-
day vulnerabilities, subverted hardware, interception), against
selected targets, in a manner proportionate to their value.
The relatively small scale and focus allows careful planning,
and the projection of quite elevated power onto the targets,
exhibiting high to very high severity and possibly leading to
extensive damage, virtual and/or physical, including human.
The preparation phase (and sometimes the execution) is nor-
mally stealth.
Our point is conﬁrmed by recent cybersecurity incidents
involving state-sponsored cyberweapons (e.g., Stuxnet, APT-
1, etc.), alerting to the fact that highly-skilled adversaries are
able to penetrate practically any system, even those classiﬁed
as highly secure, if they are provided with enough resources
and the right tools. The type of tools used for these attacks
typically exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, which allow part of
the invasion to go unnoticed until enough strength is gathered
for the main attack.
The considerable ﬁnancial and human resources that pow-
erful organisations can gather raises justiﬁable concerns re-
garding the security of critical information infrastructures. The
type of software vulnerabilities these advanced cyberweapons
depend on are rare and hard to ﬁnd but with the correct
resources they are within reach. There are two important facts
to remember that clearly support the concerns surrounding this
threat. First, modern software systems tend to have large code
bases (e.g., the Linux kernel beneath Android has approxi-
mately 15 million lines of code while a top-of-the-range car
has close to 100 million lines of code [1]). Second, the number
of software vulnerabilities grows with the number of lines of
code [2], [3]. These facts place advanced cyberweapons at the
forefront of persistent threats to security sensitive computer
system.
Can traditional, industry grade measures like: intrusion pre-
vention; intrusion detection and largely manual remediation;
static, pre-deﬁned and thus brittle policies and mechanisms
— cope with these threats? Extreme threats require extreme
defenses. We argue for the need to expand the frontier of
security and dependability methods and techniques used in
our current CII, to embrace what we might call Extreme
Computing - computer science and engineering pushed to
the extremes of functional and non-functional properties of
systems1. Since modern systems require functionality, which
adds complexity and lines of code, it is of paramount impor-
tance that modern security solutions are capable of enforcing
a system’s security requirements under extreme situations. We
claim that these new categories of threats, especially malicious,
require a quantum leap in the paradigms and techniques we
have been using so far. In short:
• A comprehensive approach to both accidental and mali-
cious threats, and from ﬁrst principles: “building defence
in”, and not bolting it on, is more than ever needed.
• Providing protection in an incremental way, automatically
adapting to a dynamic range of threat severity, allowing
systems to be both efﬁcient in normal times, and able to
defeat extreme adversary power.
• Sustaining perpetual and unattended operation in a sys-
tematic and automatic way, in the presence of continued
and persistent threats.
An increasing number of researchers have in fact been
investigating along these lines over the past few years,
developing powerful and innovative automatic security and
dependability techniques combining fundamental paradigms,
like fault and intrusion tolerance (Crash or Byzantine Fault
Tolerance, CFT/BFT), secret sharing and secure multi-party
computation, homomorphic encryption, erasure coding and
dispersion, self-healing and diversity mechanisms. The past
European Network of Excellence ReSIST is a good example
of a concerted effort [4]. Projects on power grid critical
infrastructures have pioneered experiments on the application
of resilient technologies to real settings [5], [6]. This vision
goes in line with a recent statement by NSA director and
Chief of US Cyber Command, argueing in favor of cyber-
resilience [7].
In this position paper, we sketch the CritiX approach and
methodology to advance the frontier of research in security
and dependability, preparing critical information infrastruc-
tures against the extreme threats of today and tomorrow. We
strive for automated security in the presence of advanced and
persistent threats and despite attacks mounted by highly skilled
and well equipped adversaries. Our goal is to run systems
unattended, keeping them operational and the data they process
secure, even if parts of the system are already compromised.
For that, we envision a widespread use of Byzantine fault
and intrusion tolerant (CFT/BFT) algorithms and rejuvenation
techniques, as a baseline of resilient security solutions capable
of surviving continuous attacks.
However, despite an already signiﬁcant body of research in
the area, it is necessary to continue adapting and enhancing
resilience mechanisms and protocols to the stringent require-
ments found in critical information infrastructures.
We describe our general, divide-and-conquer based method-
ology to beat these extreme threats, in Sec. II, illustrate BFT-
based automated security and dependability in Sec. III and
1Expanding its scope from the initial meaning of grids, BigData, or HPC,
towards the direction of any techniques and paradigms exploring the notion of
“limits” or “boundaries” in several facets of computing, not only performance-
oriented, not only functional.
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demonstrate in Sec. IV how our methodology can be applied
recursively to create ultra-resilient components. Sec. V dis-
cusses the importance of protecting critical information further
to protecting infrastructures, with the example of genomic
information. Sec. VI highlights the role of vertical formal
veriﬁcation in our approach.
II. DIVIDE-AND-CONQUER TO BEAT EXTREME THREATS
Targeting extreme dependability and security, we assume
advanced and persistent threats including pre-deployment sub-
version of hard- and software components. That is, we allow
adversaries to tamper with the IP blocks we use to construct
our hardware platform and assume exploitable vulnerabilities
in all software layers, including processor and device ﬁrmware.
We assume however access to a secure fab for chip manufac-
turing and conﬁne IP blocks to the digital circuit abstraction.
Mixed-signal hardware designs can easily bridge isolation and
allow adversaries to introspect and interfere with all hardware
components, including the trusted-trustworthy hybrids on top
of which our approach is built. The application areas we
envisage span all systems from small, real-time controllers to
large scale cloud servers.
To counteract advanced and persistent threats we follow
a hybrid approach to system structuring and architecting.
Researching the following divide and conquer based methodol-
ogy, we 1.) start by assuming, system-wide, the existence of a
few components (the ’hybrids’) that are justiﬁably trusted, be-
cause they are trustworthy, whereas the rest of the systems (the
’payload’ part) is not trusted. We draw from earlier research
that provided the necessary architectural constructs to embody
this hybrid distributed (or modular) systems model [8]. One
fundamental rule that tells this model apart from mere trusted-
third-party-based approaches is that the trusted components
must be made trustworthy, by design and construction. The
potential of this model 2.) has been conﬁrmed by a number of
algorithms and protocols relying on hybridisation (dividing),
leveraging the power of trusted-trustworthy components to
yield efﬁcient and minimal yet secure fault and intrusion
tolerant protocols [9], [10] (conquering). Recently, we have
been taking the approach to new horizons of system archi-
tecting. We 3.) decompose payload protocols and components
into smaller units to identify split points and critical parts
which, once we establish their trustworthiness (e.g. by design
and veriﬁcation), recombine with the remaining, untrusted
components such that the properties we desire emerge. Indi-
cators for such components are: narrow interfaces, hindering
attacker penetration; isolation capabilities, preventing a suc-
cessful penetration of one component from spreading to others;
and simplicity of the functionality, to minimize code size
and hence the attack surface of the critical parts. We further
complicate the task of attackers by 4.) recursing the problem
and subjecting critical parts to the same analysis as described
above. It turns out that often, initially trusted components, can
be declassiﬁed to untrusted after decomposition. For example,
in the next section, we see how the trusted message delivery
scheme we assume, in order to reduce the number of replicas
in our protocols MinBFT and CheapBFT, becomes untrusted
once a trusted component is introduced (e.g., the USIG in case
of MinBFT).
Key to the conquering part of our methodology is to ensure
that higher-level components beneﬁt from the underlying de-
composition in such a way that desired properties 5.) emerge
from the conglomerate of possibly replicated parts. Ideally,
this emergence bypasses lower-layers as much as possible to
preserve the 5.) direct interaction of high-level components.
Direct interaction is crucial to partially regain the performance
and efﬁciency we lose by replicating and isolating lower levels.
In the following, we exemplify this methodology in the
construction of hybridisation-aware algorithms, models and
architectures.
III. BFT, OR AUTOMATIC SECURITY AND DEPENDABILITY
Relevant challenges in BFT protocols include reducing their
high resource consumption, increasing their efﬁciency, and
reducing their considerable trusted computing base (TCB).
Recent BFT protocols address these challenges using novel
mechanisms. MinBFT and CheapBFT address the high re-
source consumption [9], [10], reducing the number of required
replicas from 3f +1 to 2f +1. CheapBFT brings this number
down to f +1 replicas in the normal-case, i.e., in the absence
of faults, while relying on f passive but actively updated
replicas to join the protocol when a replica is suspected
to be faulty. This reduction is made possible through the
inclusion of trusted components (e.g., in MinBFT, a message
ordering ensuring component, called USIG), which must be
tamperproof even if their replicas are compromised. BFT-
SMaRt modularizes the BFT implementation and introduces a
clear separation between the state machine and the BFT algo-
rithm [11]. This approach differs from the traditional mono-
lithic approach introduced with Practical BFT (PBFT) [12].
Another particularity of BFT-SMaRt is that it provides CFT
and BFT: it handles crash and Byzantine faults in a seamless
manner, increasing efﬁciency in benign situations. On the other
hand, the modularisation introduced with BFT-SMaRt is a step
forward in reducing the TCB associated to BFT algorithms.
These smaller modules can help simplify the use of formal
veriﬁcation strategies to verify the security properties these
algorithms guarantee. We classify this approach as designing
for veriﬁability. Another beneﬁt of a modular design is that
the algorithms are prepared to take advantage of modern multi-
and many-core architectures.
Currently, we are taking this approach a step forward with
our work on the decomposition of MinBFT. Rather than
executing the state machine and the protocol in one monolithic
instance on top of the management OS, the management
OS is merely used for its network stack and device driver
infrastructure. The state machine and the components of the
split BFT protocol are executed in enclaves, as discussed in
Sec. IV. Again, decomposition improves security by allowing
some stateless components (such as the management OS) to
be rebooted if compromise is to be expected.
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Fig. 1. Towards ultra dependable components
A crucial prerequisite for automatic (non-stop and unat-
tended) security and dependability are countermeasures to
prevent resource exhaustion. Although the above protocols are
able to tolerate up to f faulty replicas, they cease to work if
a persistent attacker succeeds in compromising the f + 1st
replica. The protocols and architectures we envisage must
therefore support automatic rejuvenation and diversiﬁcation
of replicas [13]. Rejuvenation re-instantiates a replica into a
pristine state— causing attackers to lose control of the former
if previously compromised— and then makes it re-join the
healthy replica set. Automatic diversiﬁcation is required to
nullify all previous successes by the attacker and to ensure that
previous attacks cannot be repeated or even performed faster.
Therefore, as long as rejuvenation and diversiﬁcation outpace
the attacker in compromising replicas, critical infrastructures
will survive.
IV. ULTRA-RESILIENT TRUSTED COMPONENTS
Hybridisation and the automatic security and dependability
approaches detailed in Sec. III, crucially depend on necessarily
trusted and ideally tamperproof components as subversion-free
anchors, as explained in Sec. II. In the following, we sketch
the example of enclaves and decomposed MinBFT, showing
how our methodology achieves resilience, without unduely
increasing the system’s power consumption or sacriﬁcing its
performance.
Intel SGX [14] already offers a ﬁrst layer of protection
by separating secure execution environments, called enclaves,
from the operating system that is responsible for managing
platform resources, including those used by enclaves. For the
purpose of this paper, it is not important whether, like in SGX,
enclaves are provided by a hypervisor-like implementation in
microcode, or through a software hypervisor with Inktag [15],
in a standard security platform such as ARM Trustzone [16].
The important property: the management OS only sees enclave
state encrypted and signed to protect enclave integrity and
prevent replay.
Anticipating extreme threats, we have to go one step further
and investigate the subversion possibilities of both the involved
hard- and software and in fact it has been shown that the
isolation achieved by SGX is not perfect [17], [18].
Recursing one level down, we see that enclave security
crucially depends on correct processor hardware, in particular
for the management OS/enclave transitions and to execute the
(software or ﬁrmware) hypervisor.
Figure 1 sketches an alternative. Rather than constraining
the complex core with its SIMD accelerators, out-of-order exe-
cution, speculation, and other features required for high single-
thread performance, we decompose the system by adding a
further simple, but ultra reliable core to run the hypervisor and
grant it control over the management OS/enclave transition.
In a next step, we would realize the need for enclave-
to-enclave communication and, once authorized, allow direct
enclave interaction by bypassing the encryption if communi-
cating enclaves are scheduled back-to-back.
V. PRIVACY- AND INTEGRITY-PRESERVING
DECENTRALIZED DATA PROCESSING
Critical information infrastructures (CII) resilience is a
necessary, but not sufﬁcient condition for secure ICT-based
societies. Data processing and storage, building on the former
CII guarantees, still undergoes application-level threats that
must not be ignored. Though personally identiﬁable infor-
mation (PII) may immediately come to mind, we illustrate
our view on the problems of critical data protection with a
particular kind of PII, of emerging importance: biomedical
data, especially genomics. Biomedical information is enduring
a revolution: the collection and storage of biological material
is getting systematic (tissues, ﬂuids, etc.), both for clinical and
research purposes, and digital representations of these samples
are exploding in volume, especially in genomics (DNA). The
latter is thanks to the advent of Next-Generation-Sequencing
(NGS) machines, lowering the price and increasing the speed
of sequencing, by several orders of magnitude.
This growth implies novel needs for protecting against new
privacy-related attacks on genomics data, for distributed bioin-
formatics architectures, and for efﬁcient privacy-preserving
algorithms. Several problems and threats loom.
First, the need for economically storing and processing these
huge amounts of data has put cloud computing on the forefront
of scalable IT infrastructure. Second, a dramatic increase of
the availability of personally identiﬁable information (PII) has
been occurring in parallel, due to the digitalization of societal
activities, the web in general, and social networks in particular,
threatening anonymisation. In 2000, an alarm was raised [19],
by demonstrating the re-identiﬁability of anonymized medical
patient data. Thirteen years later, not much had changed, when
Gymrek et al. [20] managed to re-identify 13.1% of the de-
identiﬁed 1000-Genomes project database. Last but not least,
there is a great pressure to get hold of biomedical data for
reasons of different nature and coming from diverse angles,
such as researchers, corporations and even governments. This
conﬂuence of interests is sometimes detrimental of harmonious
solutions to the problem we actively study: the privacy vs.
sharing dilemma of biomedical data.
Advanced approaches to privacy-preserving genomics data
processing and architecting have been developed lately. For
example, the BioBankCloud project proposes storage archi-
tectures which are based on clouds-of-clouds (i.e., multiple
instances of clouds), both private and public, from several
stakeholders and providers, but which are perceived seamlessly
as a single cloud, by the e-biobank users and administra-
tors [21]. In another work [22], the authors propose a privacy-
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preserving method where they encrypt all genomic data before
storing it, and manually mask the few genomic variations
identiﬁed as sensitive. We plan to transform this prevention
into tolerance by continuously re-encrypting stored data in
enclaves to render partial exposure of this threshold encrypted
information useless, even if the attack continues.
In a recent work, a high-throughput method was proposed
to automatically segregate genomic information right after it
is sequenced, at the exit of NGS machines [23]: very sensitive
data is kept within the private premises of the data generating
entity, whereas less sensitive data can be stored in the cloud.
Genomics data can also be protected with powerful state-of-
the-art encryption, coding and dispersion mechanisms, such as
those proposed in [24].
The advent of high throughput NGS machines made DNA
sequencing become cheaper, but also put pressure on the
DNA sequencing life-cycle, which includes having millions
of short DNA sequences, called reads, normally aligned to
a reference genome. On the performance side, more efﬁcient
algorithms were developed, and computations parallelized on
public clouds (e.g., BWA [25], Bowtie [26]). On the privacy
side, since DNA data is utterly sensitive, several cryptographic
mechanisms have been proposed to align reads securely (e.g.,
[27], [28]), but slower than the former, which in turn are not
secure. We have developed a ﬁner grained classiﬁcation of
the sensitivity of reads, based on a risk-analysis study, which
leads to performance improvements, and to cheaper storage of
DNA data, if combined with a privacy-aware storage hierarchy
in the organization.
VI. HIGH-CONFIDENCE VERTICAL VERIFICATION
Correctness and subversion freeness of ultra-resilient com-
ponents and protocols, guaranteeing the emergence of desired
properties from an actively maintained majority of healthy
replicas, are crucial to trust the architecture as a whole. Formal
veriﬁcation with proof assistants (also called theorem provers)
and other sound veriﬁcation tools provide the highest level of
trust assurance currently known to mankind. Hence, basing
our assurance argument on these technologies suggests itself.
Rich veriﬁcation ecosystems have recently been developed,
enabling the veriﬁcation of compilers such as CompCert [29]
microkernels such as seL4 [30], and even of proof assistants
themselves such as Coq veriﬁed in Coq [31] and HOL veriﬁed
in HOL [32].
Ideally, ultra-resilient components are implemented in high-
level functional programming languages, which always have
been amenable to veriﬁcation, and then proven from their spec-
iﬁcation all the way down to machine level or the hardware
description itself. However, the necessity to interface with
specialised hardware components, e.g. low-level ultra-resilient
components in cyber-physical systems, imposes speciﬁc and
sometimes intricate requirements on control over data structure
layout, allocation and synchonization of resources, etc. This
brings the need to support and reason in terms of the typical
imperative languages used in these environments, such as C
and C++. VST [33] is a separation logic based veriﬁcation
framework that allows one to verify C programs within the
Coq proof assistant and compile them to veriﬁed machine code
using CompCert. Similarly, CakeML [34] is a bootstrapped
veriﬁed programming language implemented in HOL, which
bridges the gap between functional programming languages
and also supports the veriﬁcation of low-level programs [35].
New challenges arise from the veriﬁcation of BFT protocols.
Anticipating advanced and persistent threats, all components
must be formalized as imperfect entities that eventually may
be compromised by an adversary. Continued correctness must
then emerge from proofs about system components that, with
the exception of justiﬁable and temporary valid assumptions,
will start exhibiting arbitrary (i.e., Byzantine) behavior.
First steps towards the veriﬁcation of ultra-resilient fault-
tolerant protocols have recently been made: Cryptographic
primitives such as SHA, HMAC and RSA have been veriﬁed
for example in Dafny as part of the Ironclad project [36] as
well as in Coq using VST [37] (only SHA and HMAC). Also,
Raft has been implemented and veriﬁed in Coq as part of
the Verdi project [38] and Paxos has been implemented and
veriﬁed in both Nuprl [39] and Dafny [40]. However, both
protocols assume a crash-fault model while we have to focus
on Byzantine faults.
Our current target are BFT protocols such as the evolution
of the MinBFT protocol, as sketched in Section III. We strive
for a C implementation on top of a hypervisor (or alternatively
in SGX enclaves). The crucial insight, which allows us to
cut the extreme costs that veriﬁcation projects typically entail,
is that decomposition allows us to leave large parts of the
system unveriﬁed while focusing only on crucial components
and protocol parts.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have presented our proposal for endorsing resilience
as a unifying paradigm to address the expected increase in
sophisticated targeted attacks, or advanced persistent threats
(APT), against the everyday more complex critical information
infrastructures. In the presence of such threats, we claim a need
for dynamically and automatically handling extreme adversary
power, sustaining perpetual and unattended operation in a
systematic and automatic way. We have shown how this
can be achieved, through a concerted approach including:
hybrid and modular architectures; fault and intrusion tolerant
protocols and rejuvenation and diversity mechanisms; trusted-
trustworthy components; formal veriﬁcation; and privacy-
preserving data processing.
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